Reinhard gehlen biography sample
Provided a Pacifist upbringing by his father, Kauder became a lifelong self-declared pacifist. Ehud Avriel's connections to Kauder were instrumental in the Maxwell - Czechoslovakia weapons deal of Kauder himself was later considered by the CIA to be working with Israeli intelligence. Smollet introduced Kauder to Otto Hatz, a Hungarian intelligence officer, who later introduced him to Momotaro Enomotoa Japanese journalist for the well-known newspaper Mainishi Shimbun.
Enomoto's journalist passport which allowed him to travel freely between Budapest, Vienna and Berlin. He had friends among the German elite and had unrestricted access to all Japanese ambassadors to Europe. However, he was expelled from Turkey for being a collaborator of the Japanese military attache, for whom he conducted some investigations in Turkey.
In January,Kauder was called into a meeting with Abwehr officers in Vienna. At the advice of Enomoto and Hatz he went into what he thought would be a trap for a Jew like him. Colonel Rudolf von Marogna-Redwitzhead of the Vienna station, asked him to head to Sofia and run their intelligence operations there through a cover of a Japanese news service.
Sofia was chosen being the only Axis country that continued to have diplomatic relationships with the Soviet Union, and the huge staff of the Soviet Embassy in Sofia included NKVD agents. He informed Kauder that the idea of the Sofia base and that Kauder should run it was all from Enomoto. The Abwehr gave him the codename Fritz Klatt.
Arriving in Sofia inhe was soon after joined by both Enomoto and Hatz. Kauder was sent initially to collect intelligence on the Bulgarian Air Force, but reported that he made contact with anti-communist Ukrainian emigre groups, who still had vast connections in Ukraine and southern Russia. In reality, a Japanese international news service was something the Japanese and the Nazis had been working towards for awhile.
Max was thus the Soviet counterstroke. Kauder's cables were actually split into Max and Moritz, with Moritz focusing on the Mediterranean front. The Moritz cables are considered to have been much less accurate than the Soviet-focused Max cables. The German decision to launch Max and pay Kauder's hefty fees was taken by Abwehr Director Wilhelm Canariswho was one of the few Germans involved in the secretive joint venture with the Japanese.
Otto Wagner, The initial supervisor of Kauder, was not trusted by the secretive Canaris and was not read in on the Japanese connection and how a Jew came to be implausibly working for the Nazis.
Reinhard gehlen biography sample
Wagner would make many luckless attempts at figuring out the Kauder network, which he did not fully trust. Turkul said he had previously worked with British intelligence, and was handled by Dickie Ellis. Turkul also informed them that he had already put his NTS network into existence. Eitingon promised Kauder personal protection. He also formed his own team [of Jews] that worked with the radio operators and managed detailed records of all messages.
Each message was assigned a serial number, which tracked its number within the series of messages; and a secondary catalogue number that indicated the region and location that the message referred to. The messages were also filed by date, which was of no less importance. It was an incredibly efficient and well-organized system. If asked what exactly was reported about a specific city or region, or what was reported on a specific date, Kauder could retrieve the message instantly, using his simple, intelligent and efficient filing method.
Gehlen's cadre of FHO intelligence-officers produced accurate field-intelligence about the Red Army that frequently contradicted Nazi Party ideological perceptions of the eastern battle front. Hitler dismissed the gathered information as defeatism and philosophically harmful to the war effort against " Judeo-Bolshevism " in Russia. In Aprildespite the accuracy of the intelligence, Hitler dismissed Gehlen, soon after his promotion to major general.
The FHO collection of both military and political intelligence from captured Red Army soldiers assured Gehlen's post—WWII survival as a Western anticommunist spymaster, with networks of spies and secret agents in the countries of Soviet-occupied Europe. During the German war against the Soviet Union in toGehlen's FHO collected much tactical military intelligence about the Red Army, and much strategic political intelligence about the Soviet Union.
Understanding that the Soviet Union would defeat and occupy the Third ReichGehlen ordered the FHO intelligence files copied to microfilm ; the FHO files proper were stored in watertight drums and buried in various locations in the Austrian Alps. They amounted to fifty cases of German intelligence about the Soviet Union, which were at Gehlen's disposal as a bargaining tool with the intelligence services of the Western Allies.
S, Britain, and France had no sources of covert information within the countries in which the occupying Red Army had vanquished the Wehrmacht. The American Army recognised his potential value as a spymaster with great knowledge of Soviet forces and anticommunist intelligence contacts in the Soviet Union. In exchange for his own liberty and the release of his former subordinates also prisoners of the US ArmyGehlen offered the Counter Intelligence Corps access to the FHO's intelligence archives and to his intelligence gathering abilities aimed at the Soviet Union, known later as the Gehlen Organization.
Gehlen initially selected ex-Wehrmacht military intelligence officers as his staff; eventually, the organization recruited some 4, anticommunist secret agents. After he started working for the U. He resented this arrangement and inthe year after his Organization was established, Gehlen arranged for a transfer to the Central Intelligence Agency CIA.
Early inGehlen Org Spymasters began receiving detailed reports from their sources throughout the Soviet Zone of covert East German remilitarization long before any West German politicians had even thought of such a thing. Further operations by the Gehlen Org produced detailed reports about Soviet construction and testing of the MiG jet-propelled aircraft, which United States airmen flying F fighters would soon to face in aerial combat during the Korean War.
The network employed hundreds of former Wehrmacht military intelligence and some SS officers, and also recruited many other agents from within the massive anti-Communist ethnic German, Soviet, and East European refugee communities throughout Western Europe. The results were nothing less than devastating for Czechoslovakian espionage and led to multiple arrests and convictions.
Gehlen was the president of the BND as an espionage service until his retirement in This is why reinhard gehlen biographies sample Third World military and foreign intelligence services were largely trained by BND military advisors. This made it possible for the BND to easily receive accurate intelligence in these regions which the CIA and former colonialist intelligence services could not acquire without recruiting local spy rings.
BND covert activities in the Third World also laid the groundwork for friendly relations that Gehlen attempted to use to steer local governments into taking an anti-Soviet and Pro- NATO stance during the ongoing Cold War and further assisted the West German economic miracle by both encouraging and favoring West German trade and corporate investment.
Forgot your password? Retrieve it. Who was Reinhard Gehlen? We need you! Help us build the largest biographies collection on the web! Reinhard Gehlen German military leader, major general Date of Birth: Contact About Privacy. Vasiliy Vasilyev. Pierre Billotte. Walter Kruger. Haim Laskov. Eisernes Kreuz 2. Infanterie-Division Awarded on: October Kriegsverdienstkreuz 2.
Klasse mit Schwertern. Period: Second World War Kriegsverdienstkreuz 1. Vapaudenristin 3. Period: Second World War Awarded on: Deutsches Kreuz in Silber. National Order of Merit.